 |
|
|
 |
Joined: 29/06/2009
Posts: 8
|
|
|
To Kavette: Standby for another lengthy post.
Once again you are correct, and your insight and viewpoint is very meaningful. After an in depth review of the Cali accident during recurrent training many years ago, at that time I was very familiar with the Cali accident. My version posted here was a simplified short version. Your account is obviously more descriptive. As I recall, as they selected the incorrect waypoint and the aircraft began to turn, their conversation was not about being lost, rather it was more of a discussion as to why the aircraft was turning. I do not remember them considering themselves lost, or them having an awareness of being lost. It was certainly a long time ago, so my memory may not be serving me well. Lost is a mighty big word. As we used to jokingly say in the Navy, “Naval Aviators never get lost; we just sometimes get temporarily disoriented.” The Cali flight crew became temporarily disoriented not lost. Yes I know, it is just semantics. These two accidents of course have their differences and you may not agree with my analogy, but they were both CFIT accidents due to positional error and a lack of visual references. They also both received ground proximity warnings and responded appropriately (except for the speed brakes) but it was too late to avert disaster. In that respect, I find the two accidents to be very similar.
So you are saying that TE901 was VFR therefore they were actually in controlled airspace? As I mentioned earlier, I was unsure on this point. You sound very knowledgeable about the subject, and I don’t mean to condescend, but you do understand that VFR is controlled airspace? I’m sure you know this, but since I do not know your background or experience level, I must ask. I had assumed airspace in that region was uncontrolled. I have never flown that far south and I do not have charts for that area. Do you know who the controlling agency is for that low altitude airspace? I must admit, I am a bit surprised that remote area would indeed be controlled airspace. Maybe that area isn’t as remote as I’m assuming.
I do agree with you about the reduced forward visibility and how it can and probably did mask the terrain. The CVR has been interpreted in various ways, but I find it difficult to dismiss the FE’s (or someone on the flight deck) comment of concern over their descent as meaning something else. As a former 727 FE and line check airman, I too voiced my concern to the pilots numerous times about one thing or another. The two pilots up front were nearly always senior to me, but they still didn’t have the right to kill me. Even when I became a 727 Captain, most decisions were made by three pilots, not just one or two. If the FE was concerned about their descent, he certainly was not vocal enough to make his point clear. I suspect we will never truly know about this point.
As a former Naval Aviator flying low levels in the snow covered countryside of Norway, we flew so low that the bow wave of the aircraft would cause the snow to move underneath the aircraft as it passed over. My point here is that we too flew at extremely low altitudes in snow covered regions. The major difference is that in order to descend to these low altitudes, we always ensured ourselves an ample margin of safety by always maintaining distinct vertical references. If we hadn’t, we would have surely perished. Here is another example of ensuring depth perception and altitude awareness. While at sea practicing night bombing, we were required to have two flares in the water, not just one. The distance between the two flares gave us the depth perception we desperately needed to avoid flying straight down into the water during our weapons delivery. How does this relate to TE901? In my opinion, the mistake the crew of flight TE901 made was to not proactively and positively ensure adequate vertical visual references to safely continue at their altitude. With ANY uncertainty about terrain clearance, an immediate climb should have been initiated. Although I think we are in full agreement about why they didn’t see the terrain, we can still dispute what caused them not to see the terrain, and why they thought they were safe, but the fact is, they didn’t see the terrain, and they were not safe. I believe the flight crew erred, but please understand that I’m not sitting up here on a high horse passing horrific judgment on this flight crew. This is not my purpose, nor my right. We are all capable of making dangerous mistakes such as this one. My harsh viewpoint is probably not popular or politically correct, but my sole purpose for discussing this event and other similar events in detail is to hopefully prevent myself or someone else from making a similar mistake in the future. All for now. SW
|
|
|
|
 | |
|
|
|
Joined: 26/10/2009
Posts: 11
|
|
|
JCuniverse wrote
Our hearts are with the people who died at Erebus and their families- also with those who worked under extreme stress to determine the cause of the tragedy. Mr Chippindale did the best he could and Gordon Vette took it to the next level by demonstrating what whiteout did to the crew of TE901.
Mahon wrote an eloquent summary of the tragedy and pointed to the single dominant cause being the change of coordinates and failure to advise the crew and Mahon went further to say that the flight crew were not responsible for the disaster.
God bless Mahon - however I feel Mahon and the crew of TE901 missed a fundamental rule in aviation (Never mix VFR and IFR)
The INS is a NAV instrument to be relied on above MSA. On the day , the crew descended under VFR with a couple of racetrack orbits and re-armed the INS NAV, providing the crew with a false and fatal level of comfort.
I propose that if the crew did not re-arm NAV mode after the second orbit - they would have aborted VFR and climbed out much earlier.
On this basis I propose that this VFR-IFR mix is the dominant cause of the tragedy.
The power of confession is redeeming.
I agree completely that Mahon missed a fundamental point, and one which is lost on laymen in general.
The INS was never intended for use as a navigation system appropriate for tight manipulation of an aircraft at low altitudes near mountainous terrain. While fundamentally an accurate piece of equipment, the whole system was never, and could never, be established with the appropriate layers of saftey that would be required for it to be used in the way Collins was using it.
This was a system designed for getting the aircraft from one waypoint to the next above a minimum safe altitude, usually across vast streches of water. The fact that it was re-armed during the two orbits suggests to me that conditions were not VFR, and Collins knew it; as such he was meticulous to re-arm the INS to buy himself some reassurance (which, as we know, was tragically misguided).
Much has been made of the change of navigation co-ordinates. However it could be very possible for the crew to wrongly enter numerical data themselves as they manually programmed the computer off the NAV printout prior to the flight. If tight, 100 percent infallible navigation had ever been envisaged as a requirement of the INS, manual input of data would never have been allowed.
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Joined: 23/01/2010
Posts: 7
|
|
|
Apologies for the late post. I only just found this site.
Waves, I don't work for United (the airline to whom I believe you are referring when you say... "biggest airline in the world") and I am not a pilot. However, it has been my belief (as the daughter of someone who lost a former colleague in the crash, and is an engineer who has flown on the flightdeck of an Air NZ DC-10) for many years, that the fault lies not entirely with the pilots, but with the corporate culture of Air NZ in the 1970's, the total lack of specific polar training given to these pilots, and the large (degrees) of alteration programmed into their flight computers just hours before the flight took off from Auckland that fateful day.
This was the same airline which routinely underfuelled aircraft, in one case (around the same time) forcing a 747 down by the skin of their teeth in Nadi, Fiji (I'm talking NO fuel left... at all... luckily they had the airport in view and the landing gear down, but that's all they had.) I wish I could quote references, but these are the province of my father... who, due to his full schedule aged 64, doesn't spend any time on forums like these.)
The point I am making - no, I'm not a pilot. But the comparisons you make are simply not relevant to this accident - northern pilots are (as I understand) more routinely trained in "sector whiteout" and other phenomena, and these pilots (Collins, for example, had experience dating back more or less 30 years) were simply not trained in these conditions. That said, they had been given clearance from the local ATC (as much as it was) to go as low as they did, they were running a sightseeing trip, and Air New Zealand had changed the co-ordinates for their approach to Mc Murdo by far more than any of the pilots could have been aware (as computers were far less "interactive" 30 years ago, and the original co-ordinate had been mistyped by what ended up being 27 miles... so the "small" correction made the night before, ended up being huge... and, I believe, the factor which eventually killed them.)
I'm sure you'll dismiss this as - "just a girl, and not a pilot." For what it's worth, I'm 37, and I recall the accident clearly (I wasn't your average clueless kid). I flew regularly on those Air NZ DC-10s, and in fact flew on one less than a month after the accident (MEL-AKL... not a route affected by ice.) IMHO, though, the fault lies squarely at the organizational culture of Air NZ circa 1979, and not entirely with the pilots, as you seem to think.
Just a perspective from the Southern Hemisphere (although ironically, I write this at 3am in NYC, as I am unable to sleep)... we just don't see much in the way of snow down there.
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Joined: 23/01/2012
Posts: 39
|
|
|
I’m also slightly late to the site, but have to agree 100% with Gasman’s summary.
Peripat’s response is interesting, because she does what a lot of intelligent people do when faced with an argument they can’t win: They change the argument, to one they can win.
Judge Mahon completely exonerated the pilots. The sentence where he did so is quoted on this very website (see FAQs): “In my opinion, neither Captain Collins nor First Officer Cassin nor the flight engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.” NZALPA obviously concurs, given its support for a parliamentary exoneration of the crew.
The issue, therefore, is not whether the pilots were “entirely to blame”, as Peripat puts it. The issue is whether the pilots were entirely without blame.
|
|
|
|
| |