It seems to me, after an overview of this website, that the findings of Chief Investigator Ron Chippindale have been somewhat discredited. In talking with a pilot and simulation trainer today I am backed in my belief that the findings of Chippindale are not to be overlooked. There are set parameters in which pilots are to fly, clearly above 16,000ft in this instance, these are in place for a very very good reason. The tone of this "enlightening" website is that Mahon's report takes precedence over Chippindale’s and this leads to a somewhat biased approach. The website is created by the New Zealand Air Line Pilots' association (NZALPA) which goes to show why the pilots are being protected, but knowing that Mr Chippindale was a very meticulous man in all his works leads me to ask the question, “why have his findings been tossed aside…?”.

I know my respect, and that of many others, will continue to be with the late Mr Chippindale as even after his retirement he was, time after time, approached by countless governments wanting his interpretation on international incidents.

On the contrary, I think the information that is available enlightens me to what Mr Chippendale was up against, the technicalities of the flight, how it was operated, the environment in which it operated and I am talking about both the aircraft flight medium as well as the management and corporation medium. 

The information I have seen & read re-affirms for me that Mr Chippendale was very meticulous and extremely professional in his approach, and his conclusion highlighted a major point in the envelope of flight safety.

It is very easy after 30 years of hindsight for many of us to continue analysing what we see today as the facts and come to conclusions and reasons as to the cause.  In my personal opinion it was not and never will be attributable to one or the other - in my view there a was a systemic falure across the spectrum of flight safety and cupability perhaps rested with the industry as a whole.  But neither this is helpful for those directly affected and there is I think some comfort that the improvements in aviation safety over the years, and industrial safety in general for that matter, has helped considerably to improve and mitigate the risks that are ever present in aviation, and this was because of the work that Mr Chippendale did.

As an airline Captain for the world’s largest airline with over 14,000 hours of flight time, I for one certainly appreciate the attempt of exonerating the pilots from blame in this tragic accident.  Please understand that my comments here are not intended to disrespect anyone.  Unfortunately, I believe the CVR arguments are a moot point and seem to serve only as a distraction from the obvious reason for the crash.  CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT).  The investigators can argue about, manipulate, change, alter, or even fabricate CVR conversation, but they cannot change the fact that the flight crew flew the aircraft into the ground.  Whether or not they were in IMC conditions is somewhat irrelevant.  It’s quite obvious that for whatever reason, they did not visually see the terrain which was directly ahead in their path.  If they were IMC, or if they were heads down looking at charts or radio squelch knobs, is immaterial (i.e.  Eastern Airlines L-1011 Flight 401 VMC CFIT crash into the Florida Everglades in 1972).  cockpit discussions did not indicate any type of aircraft problem other than a minor communication glitch.  The aircraft was not in distress and it was flying normally when the flight crew received the GPWS warning.  They were obviously unaware they were about to receive this GPWS warning.  While they did respond appropriately to the GPWS warning, it is a warning which they should have never received.  Although my interpretation may be harsh and unwanted, I believe the flight crew believed they were 26 miles from a necessary climb point, when in reality they were in need of an immediate climb.  This locates them about 30 miles from where they thought their position was.  This certainly does not mean they were lost as some have put it, it just means that their acceptable navigational error tolerance was much too high.  As a low level tactical attack pilot for the US Navy, our navigational error tolerance was reduced to nearly zero when we were flying low level missions below terrain level.  My sincere condolences certainly extend to everyone involved in this tragic story, but trying to pretend it was the result of something other than pilot error CFIT is truly counterproductive to safety.  The recent AirFrance crash seems to be following in this same path.  My harsh but probable opinion is very much the same.  Pilot error due to continuing into a Level 5 massive thunderstorm.  Not many aircraft are built to withstand 100 mph instantaneous vertical wind velocity changes.  My point here is that even as professional pilots, we are all capable of making mistakes, which in my opinion this flight crew did.  In conclusion, in the name of safety, we should not cover up the obvious in an attempt to protect or honor our fallen comrades.  SW

Having worked for Ron Chippindale and later in the Royal Commission would I support the comments that Ron Chippindale was a meticulous and thorough investigator, but  I did not agree with his findings.    His investigation was made all the more difficult with the reluctance of Air NZ to release documents that later became available to the Royal Commission along with the records of shredded documents.     However, we could go on disecting the accident.    It remains, clearly,  a human factors accident.   How we allocate the proportions of human failure or weakness can be debated.     The crew were not trained for such visual phenomena,  and having a 16,000 ft limit set by management is unrealistic when the only signs of human habitation or scenic attraction  are visible from about 2,000 ft.      The loss of our friends and colleagues only becomes bearable if we have learnt from this tragedy.    Can we make the same or similar mistake again???

Waves - I would like to understand further your comment that whether they were IMC is immaterial

Could this tragedy have occurred if they stayed IMC ??

thanks..JC (+64 21 041 9379 )

I’m sorry JC, but I believe neither is correct. If they were in controlled airspace, then you would be correct, but if they were in uncontrolled airspace, which I am presuming they were, then they were not being controlled by anyone. In other words, NO RULES. So Visual Flight Rules (VFR) would not apply. This is an over simplification, but for the most part, that is how it works. Example: In uncontrolled airspace, there are no rules as there are in VFR to maintain specific distances from clouds. Compared to VFR, uncontrolled airspace is a dangerous free for all. As a point of interest, if Flight TE901 was in uncontrolled airspace, they would have been legal to fly in and out of clouds as much as they desired. Legal, but not wise! In the US, we have very little uncontrolled airspace above 1200 feet AGL, but we certainly have lots of it below 1200 feet AGL and 800 feet AGL. Check out any VFR sectional.

To Investigator: For starters, our navigational equipment has improved dramatically since this 1979 accident. Most of our aircraft nav systems continuously cross check our position with ground reference stations and Satellite Global Positioning Systems. These systems are unbelievably accurate even in high latitude areas. For certain types of navigation and approaches, we must check the system for drift which we call RNP (Required Navigation Performance). Additionally, procedures for my airline for international flight require plotting all ocean crossing points. Better nav equipment would probably not have helped TE 901, but plotting their course may have illuminated their apparent route change. SA (Situational Awareness) and CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) are vast subjects that involve many different areas much too involved for discussion here.