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15/09/2015 11:26 pm
 

Macfarlane’s book does not contain First Officer Gabriel’s initial written statements, if any. It does, however, contain part of the evidence given by Ron Chippendale in a US court case. According to that evidence, First Officer Gabriel told Ron Chippendale that be believed that the track went directly to McMurdo Station and that it crossed over Ross Island and Erebus. (Macfarlane pp349, 350) For some reason, Ron Chippendale did not keep any record of the statement. (Macfarlane p351)

When he came to give his evidence to the Royal Commission, First Officer Gabriel said that he did not believe that the track would cross Ross Island and Erebus. If the track is put to one side, we are left with the position of the waypoint. On that matter, there is at least some evidence that First Officer Gabriel’s initial statement, to Ron Chippendale, was that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station.

At some stage after speaking with Ron Chippendale First Officer Gabriel would have been interviewed by ALPA’s lawyers, who would then have a drafted a written statement.  It is not known whether the statement was provided to First Officer Gabriel in advance or presented to him at the hearing rooms on the day he was to give evidence. What is known is that the latter tactic was used on Captain Simpson.

Before preparation of First Officer Gabriel's statement began, ALPA’s lawyers had had access to most of the documentary evidence, which established that three flight plans to the McMurdo area were available at the briefing of 9 November 1979:

  1. A flight plan dated October 1977 which First Officer Cassin used to program the simulator and which was later found in the wreckage. The longitude of the McMurdo waypoint was 166 degrees. There were no markings on the document found in the wreckage. (Macfarlane p104, p220)

  2. A flight plan dated 7 November 1979 which Captain Wilson brought to the briefing. The longitude of the McMurdo waypoint was 164 degrees. The waypoint was underlined. (Macfarlane  p79)

  3. The “as flown” version of (2) above, also brought to the briefing by Captain Wilson. Again, the longitude of the McMurdo waypoint was 164 degrees. The waypoint was highlighted. (Exhibit 206C)

Of the three flight plans, (2) and (3) suited ALPA, whereas (1) did not. ALPA’s lawyers chose the following words for First Officer Gabriel: “During the talk through of those notes Captain Wilson handed out some flight plans from a previous Antartic flight. He told us they were there for us to look at but we were not to take them away with us. I looked at a flight plan depicting the route to McMurdo and I remember that the McMurdo waypoint was either underlined or highlighted in some way.”(Macfarlane p232)

The written statement continued as follows:

“At some stage during the talk through I made a comparison of the TACAN coordinates which Captain Wilson had mentioned were noted on the HI NDB-A plate and the coordinates of the McMurdo way-point on the flight plan which I had in front of me. In making that comparison I realised that the flight plan “McMurdo” way-point was to the west of the TACAN.” (Macfarlane p233)

That statement was true of all three flight plans. In (1), the waypoint was 17 minutes of longitude west of the TACAN. In (2) and (3), it was nearly two degrees west. 

At the hearing, First Officer Gabriel read out the written statement and was then questioned by the various lawyers. The transcript, at page 1727, includes the following:

AT THE STAGE WHEN THE COMPUTER FLT PLANS WERE BEING HANDED AROUND DID YOU YOURSELF TAKE A MENTAL NOTE OF WHAT THE COORDINATES FOR MCMURDO WERE . . . I AM NOT SURE WHEN IT WAS DONE FROM WHAT I RECALL THE FLT PLAN WAS IN FRONT OF ME FOR A WHILE AND AT SOME STAGE DURING THE BRIEFING IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THE TACAN COORDINATES HAD BEEN WRITTEN ON THE BRIEFING SHEET AND I THINK THEY WERE IN BALL POINT PEN ON ONE OF THE CHARTS AND I CAN RECALL AT THAT STAGE JUST NOTICING THAT YES ITS OFF TO ONE SIDE IT IS A BIT EAST OF THE MCMURDO POSITION.

Of the three flight plans, only one had the TACAN “a bit east of the McMurdo position”, that being (1). In (2) and (3), the TACAN was over 20 miles to the east. The flight plan First Officer Gabriel sighted must therefore have been that used to program the simulator. The longitude of the McMurdo waypoint was 166 degrees, because the waypoint was at McMurdo Station, not over 20 miles west. That explains why First Officer Gabriel asked no question on hearing the audio say that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. It also explains why he asked no question when the simulator was repositioned to the McMurdo waypoint and ended up over McMurdo Station, not 20 miles west.

What of the evidence about underlining or highlighting? That could have been an invention by ALPA’s lawyers which First Officer Gabriel went along with. Alternatively, the flight plan used to program the simulator and the flight plan found in the wreckage are not necessarily the same document. That used to program the simulator might have been marked in some way.

First Officer Gabriel’s evidence was, eventually, consistent with his having sighted a McMurdo Station waypoint at the briefing, which was also what he said to Ron Chippendale (according to Ron Chippendale).

On a related matter, although Macfarlane’s book is a useful as a source of information, the additions by its author are not. His deranged rantings are peppered with allegations of lying and perjury against all and sundry, yet Macfarlane’s book provides a revealing insight into his own bona fides. In support of one of the stupid points he attempts to make, Macfarlane seeks to establish that First Officer Gabriel’s understanding from the briefing was that the McMurdo waypoint was to the west of McMurdo Station. At page 351 he quotes part of the evidence given by First Officer Gabriel in response to questions by one of the lawyers. The quote appears to support Macfarlane, but the transcript shows the very next question to be “Are you speaking now of what you did and thought at the time of the briefing on 9 November?” Answer: “No it was after the briefing.” Macfarlane left that bit out. Later, when First Officer Gabriel is questioned about the briefing, his evidence is consistent with the waypoint being at McMurdo Station, not 20 miles west.

 

 
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17/09/2015 3:43 am
 
Hi there,

As an aside, and not that it's my call to make, but I'm not sure why the need to create three separate threads for Simpson, Gabriel and Irvine - if you'd like to merge them into one at some point I'd be happy to assist.

Chippindale's appearance at the 1987 US case was in itself controversial - he was originally supposed to be called as a witness for the plaintiffs (the families et al) to provide the basic technical background of the accident.  However, when the proceedings began he was first called as a witness for the US Navy (having apparently been invited to do so at the behest of the NZ government with the US Navy covering his travel costs) - counsel for the US Navy then had him repeat not just the technical details but also his determination of pilot error as the cause, and the case was summarily thrown out.  Notably, this meant that the question of why between 4 and 5 minutes of the MacCentre ATC tape had been erased was never brought up in any case relating to the accident - because it was a US matter, it was outside the jurisdiction of Mahon's Royal Commission, and Chippindale's testimony in the US case led the judge to end the proceedings before it could be examined.  For what it's worth, I try to maintain an open mind when it comes to Chippindale and his motivations - I'm not convinced he set out to deliberately mislead.  That said, many of his methods were dubious and categorically would not pass muster in terms of modern accident investigation.  It's entirely probable that he honestly believed his conclusions were correct - and this made him a very useful tool in the hands of those who may not have been particularly honest.

The lack of a sworn statement from Gabriel to bolster Chippindale's claims means that some doubt must always exist as to the veracity of the testimony you describe - but I wouldn't go as far as to say he was deliberately disingenuous.

Anyway, down to brass tacks.  You yourself said that the briefing was in two distinct parts - Captain Wilson's audio/visual plus verbal section followed by Captain Johnson's sim session (which included the NDB procedure using the 1977 co-ordinates).  The plans you refer to as 2 and 3 (both of which contained the Dailey Island 164.48 waypoint) were both a part of Wilson's section, which related directly to the route they were going to fly.  Plan number 1 (again, your definition) from 1977 appeared only during the sim exercise.  I've previously mentioned wondering as to the usefulness of a simulated procedure using real co-ordinates of an NDB (and I'm pretty sure that the ground aid in the 1977 plan was a civil NDB rather than a TACAN) which no longer existed, but leaving that aspect to one side I'll assume that it was in lieu of a revised sim scenario using the TACAN co-ordinates which had yet to be programmed.  Though I'll add that I'd hope Johnson would have made it clear that the position of the simulated runway lights they were seeing would bear no relation to the position those lights would be in if they did it for real around the TACAN.

If the above scenario is more-or-less how things went, then it follows that the 1977 plan was provided only to service the simulation and would not likely have been perceived as a guide to how and where the pilots being briefed would have expected their flights to be going.  Both of the more recent example flight plans clearly showed the waypoint located at 164.48 - a location related to neither ground aid, nor McMurdo Station or Williams Field*.  Somewhat unusual, granted - but not exactly a cause for concern, particularly as it corresponded very closely to the "military route".

We could go around the houses on this forever (especially if you're half as stubborn as I am!), and I can tell that you are thoroughly convinced that the pilots had the waypoint at the station.  It's an opinion you're absolutely entitled to hold (as I am mine and Chippindale, Mahon, MacFarlane, Holmes etc. are - or were - theirs) - and I'd never be so presumptuous as to say otherwise or claim I've got all the answers...

So for now - bar tidying up the separate threads into something more useful - I'll state my case as concisely as I can and say my piece :

1. Presuming that the script (Exh. 12) was the one used at the briefing, I believe that the AV presentation as a whole was carried over unchanged from 1977.

2. As Capt. Gemmell moved on to bigger and better things following the 1977 Antarctic flights, he handed the project over - but, for whatever reason, from this point forward no one person "owned" the operation entirely.

3. When Hewitt computerised the flight plan in 1978 and (mistakenly or otherwise) set the terminating waypoint at 164.48, Nav Section duly marked the track on a T&D diagram which was assumed to supersede the old one - and passed the revised material on to Ops without further inquiry.

4. Ops Section, on receiving the revised material, assumed the alteration was deliberate and improvised a verbal workaround to the fact that the 1977 script and new flight plan were somewhat at odds.  The '78 flights go without a hitch (in part due to consistently good weather IIRC) and no-one thinks any more of it.

5. Come 1979, another change to procedure because the old NDB has been withdrawn - but because no-one "owns" the project any more (at least not to the extent of ordering a revised sim scenario be programmed), Ops again have to "make do" and use the old scenario - presumably with a verbal caveat (on the basis that the relative position of the simulated ice runway to the NDB would be very different to its relative position to the TACAN).  The 1977 flight plan is used for the sim training - and for this purpose alone -because it is the most convenient source of information Ops have with regard to the old NDB's position.

These points are just one facet of my general belief that ANZ was suffering from a growing case of organisational entropy.  From management on down, complacency seemed to have been creeping in, while taking responsibility and attention to detail was slipping.

That's for another day though.  The overriding reasons I disagree with your belief that the pilots at Collins' briefing thought the waypoint was at McMurdo Station are threefold :

1. Capt. Simpson - both in his written statement and under cross-examination - made it clear that while he was surprised at the waypoint's distance from the TACAN, he did not believe the waypoint was either in the wrong place or anywhere other than where he expected it to be when considered in isolation.

2. The 1977 flight plan used at the briefing appears to have related only to the simulated exercise - which itself related to an NDB that all present knew had been withdrawn some time previously.  To my mind it doesn't make any logical sense for any of the pilots present to have believed the old NDB was their waypoint - firstly because their more recent sample flight plans (two of them) clearly stated the waypoint to be elsewhere and secondly because the old NDB had been withdrawn - so using its location as a waypoint would no longer make any sense.

3. Regardless of whether they thought the route took them over Erebus or not, if they believed the waypoint to have been McMurdo Station or the TACAN then that assertion would have supported ANZ's case.  Why then did they instead choose to act as witnesses for NZALPA (which, in Les Simpson's case at least, went against the grain) and the families, when sticking with the company would have been far less risky career-wise?

In the interests of beginning to wrap this conversation up for now, I must say that I get the impression that you see this largely as a company versus union issue - one in which you're inclined to side with the former and see the latter as willing to go to any lengths to defend their late colleagues.  From three and a half decades since and over 11,000 miles away my view, for what it's worth, is that the truth is somewhat more complex.  As far as I can tell, NZALPA and their counsel largely took a supporting role at the Commission - the most aggressive approach to ANZ came from family counsel, particularly Paul Davison QC for the Collins family.  I can't agree with your notions that NZALPA and their lawyers obstructed Simpson, Gabriel and Irvine from saying what they wanted to say - not least because none of them ever made that assertion at any point since - even post-retirement when to do so would have cost them nothing.

Finally, with respect I have to take issue with your characterisation of Stuart MacFarlane's work as "...deranged rantings ... peppered with allegations of lying and perjury against all and sundry".  As I said before, he is as entitled to his opinion as you are entitled to yours.  While I'm aligned with the "crew not at fault" position, my inclination is not to ascribe to malice that which may be due to incompetence - and whether one thinks the crew at fault or not, there's no arguing that there was a lot of administrative incompetence in evidence at ANZ in 1979.

 
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17/09/2015 5:24 am
 

“As an aside, and not that it's my call to make, but I'm not sure why the need to create three separate threads for Simpson, Gabriel and Irvine ... “

It was an attempt to keep any responses, from you in particular, on the subject. It didn’t work.

"The overriding reasons I disagree with your belief that the pilots at Collins' briefing thought the waypoint was at McMurdo Station are threefold :

 1. Capt. Simpson - both in his written statement and under cross-examination - made it clear that while he was surprised at the waypoint's distance from the TACAN, he did not believe the waypoint was either in the wrong place or anywhere other than where he expected it to be when considered in isolation."

Captain Simpson’s written statement and cross-examination occurred while he was labouring under an assumption that was probably wrong, namely, that the flight plan he sighted at the briefing was one of Captain Wilson’s. That possibility was never suggested to him by ALPA, for obvious reason.

"2. The 1977 flight plan used at the briefing appears to have related only to the simulated exercise - which itself related to an NDB that all present knew had been withdrawn some time previously.  To my mind it doesn't make any logical sense for any of the pilots present to have believed the old NDB was their waypoint - firstly because their more recent sample flight plans (two of them) clearly stated the waypoint to be elsewhere and secondly because the old NDB had been withdrawn - so using its location as a waypoint would no longer make any sense."

Re-read the evidence. Even though the NDB had been withdrawn, Captain Johnson decided to practise the cloud-break procedure nevertheless, using the NDB.

The two more recent sample flight plans did not “clearly state” the waypoint to be elsewhere. The flight plan was a list of waypoints, one of which had a “4” instead of a “6”.

"3. Regardless of whether they thought the route took them over Erebus or not, if they believed the waypoint to have been McMurdo Station or the TACAN then that assertion would have supported ANZ's case.  Why then did they instead choose to act as witnesses for NZALPA (which, in Les Simpson's case at least, went against the grain) and the families, when sticking with the company would have been far less risky career-wise?"

I don’t know, but so what? The three pilots gave their evidence. As regards First Officers Gabriel and Irvine, their evidence was consistent with a belief that the track was to McMurdo Station. Captain Simpson’s evidence was not, but his initial statements were.

"I can't agree with your notions that NZALPA and their lawyers obstructed Simpson, Gabriel and Irvine from saying what they wanted to say - not least because none of them ever made that assertion at any point since - even post-retirement when to do so would have cost them nothing."

Wrong: Captain Simpson made that very assertion.

"Finally, with respect I have to take issue with your characterisation of Stuart MacFarlane's work as "...deranged rantings ... peppered with allegations of lying and perjury against all and sundry".  As I said before, he is as entitled to his opinion as you are entitled to yours."

Firstly, you can drop the feigned politeness and the repeated "with respect" insertions. This is an anonymous forum. Be as rude and disrespectful as you please, but please stay on the subject. As regards Macfarlane, he was not entitled to support his opinion by deliberately misleading readers when quoting evidence. He quoted a passage from the evidence and made it very clear that it was what First Officer Gabriel believed about the location of the waypoint and that the belief was acquired during the briefing, not days after – but the quote ends just before First Officer Gabriel is asked whether the belief was acquired during the briefing, to which the answer is “No, it was after the briefing.” That was an obvious attempt to pull the wool over readers' eyes, done under the assumption that no-one would check - which underlines just how thick Macfarlane was / is.

 
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