There is something very strange going on here, because we have professional pilots divided into two completely separate camps over some of the most basic principles of airmanship.
It appears that the majority of NZALPA members support the exoneration of the crew, on the basis that they were not at fault in any way. Then there are those on my side of the fence, who place all the blame on the crew. Where there is nothing wrong with the aircraft, the crew will usually bear some of the responsibility, the question being how much. But in this case, the choice is between 100% or 0%. There’s no middle ground.
Before reading ‘Daughters of Erebus’, I was a middle grounder, the main reason being that the crew was not briefed on the danger of flying visually below cloud. But I always wondered about that comment made by the captain at the beginning of the transcript. And now it transpires that the captain and one of the first officers attended a briefing at Operation Deep Freeze. For me, that has to be the end of the VMC argument. The descent below MSA was made in instrument meteorological conditions.
So everything boils down to whether the IMC descent was justified. Although a radar assist was proposed, the crew were unable to contact the ATC (which might be why the captain decided, wrongly, to make a visual descent). There was a TACAN available, whose distance function could have been used as a cross-check, but its signal was not being received. That leaves the Area Inertial Navigation System.
In Paul Holmes book, he emphasises the accuracy of the AINS. Judge Mahon did much the same in his report, and I assume that this is also the basis for NZALPA’s position. But the AINS was not an approved instrument for a landing approach or any other descent below MSA. I didn’t think there was any argument about that. The DC-10’s AINS was a top-of-the-range three platform system, which was remarkably good at its job, which was to get the aircraft from an area on one side of the Pacific to an area on the other. But once in the area, the aircraft’s position had to be confirmed before going below MSA. Why was the AINS not sufficient confirmation? First, because it tended to ‘drift’ the longer it went with a ground update, and second, because it could be wrong. A waypoint might have been entered incorrectly – or a pilot attempting to change a waypoint or punch an offset might do so incorrectly – or the navigation section might have changed a waypoint and forgotten to tell the crew.
I do not know whether this might have anything to do with things, but it should be noted that GPS was not available in 1979.